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GIFTS AND TRADE 
Mirowskian, Gudemanian, and Milbergian 
themes 
John Davis 
The grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of 
what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is 
a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation. 
(Lyotard, 1984: 37) 
Saying that there is no master discourse allows us to see the space of 
discourse as constituted out of competing discourses, each of which may 
itself claim to be a master discourse. A postmodern interrogation of rival-
rous discourses may proceed by granting each a temporary, relative 
integrity, so as to represent the whole space they occupy as an interaction 
between claimant master discourses, the interaction between them tending 
to reinforce or erode the identity of each. The relative integrity of each indi-
vidual discourse may then be investigated in terms of its current 
conceptual structure, a network of compulsory meanings and allowable 
inferences between meanings. Discourses' identities are transient, because 
these structures do not endure. Their reconstruction or collapse is driven by 
their interaction with rival discourses and by internally discovered struc-
tural incoherences, either of which may undermine stability of meaning, 
cause its dissemination, and necessitate the rebuilding of new meaning 
structures, shifting or creating discourses' identities. 
Philip Mirowski tracks the rise and fall of the postwar economic 
anthropological discourse on the gift that treated the meaning of giving 
the gift as polar alternative to the meaning of reciprocal exchange. For 
Marshall Sahlins and Chris Gregory, the meanings of both gift and 
exchange are embedded in a social-cultural concept nest: [kinship 
ties / clan distinctions/ social political hierarchies], which determines 
allowable inferences regarding where material transfers fall on a single 
continuum from gift to balanced reciprocity to even negative reciprocity 
(or agression). In effect, the discourse's structure makes the social-
cultural concept nest arbitrate inferences regarding how we classify 
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material transfers. The inferential vehicle by which this arbitration occurs 
is the discourse's premising inclusion-exclusion membership patterns in 
social-cultural groups as the central invariant in the system. Gifts are 
then classified as what is transferred between or within 'like' sOcial 
groups. Where 'like' social groups do not come into play, material 
transfer operates according to principles of reciprocal exchange, that is 
according to the abstract logic of pure value equivalence. ' 
For Sahlins and Gregory, however, this alternative principle of invari-
ance must be thought subordinate to the social likeness group principle 
of invariance. When we make social group likeness our focus, abstract 
value equivalence appears as a socially disembedded form of material 
transfer. Thus the social-cultural concept nest arbitrates inferences 
regarding how we interpret gifts and exchanges, and in particular 
defines reciprocal exchange as 'non-gift' transfer. 
Yet Mirowski argues, on closer scrutiny the discourse's proposed 
social group likeness principle of invariaru;:e lacks stable meaning. 
Sahlins and Gregory's texts are unable to develop and sustain the 
concept of inclusion-€xclusion membership in a social group, and even 
add to its conceptual instability by retreating to market concepts of 
scarcity and exchange to 'help' explain what increasingly becomes the 
'gift economy.' Even worse, they allow that gifts alter social-cultural 
groupings, thereby undermining the very idea of social group likeness as 
a distinct principle of system invariance. 
Left standing, the victor by default, is abstract value equivalence as 
the system's only principle of invariance explaining material transfers. 
The gift in its original sense as non-reciprocated transfer is now simply 
the 'other', the non-commodity. But emptied of independent content it 
cannot be understood but as part of 'gift exchange' (except perhaps as 
briefly disguised by giftwrap - price tags discreetly removed of course). 
The implication of Mirowski's argument is that postwar economic 
anthropological discourse on the gift was corrupt from the outset. But 
this is not a Derridean corruption, an irresistable displacement of 
meaning that frustrates any settled interpretation of the meaning of the 
gift whatsoever. Rather the source of the corruption lies in the 
discourse's determination to set the meaning of the gift as 'non-exchange 
material transfer alternative to reciprocal exchange', a conceptual appa-
ratus rather at the heart of market economy discourse. 
Having begun in this way, economic anthropological discourse found 
itself saddled with an alien conceptual structure. In particular, 'material 
transfers' presupposed 'principles of invariance', which would then need 
to be drawn from the social-cultural concept nest that constituted the 
pre-existing conceptual apparatus of economic anthropological discourse. 
But this concept nest (it should perhaps have been recognized) does not 
readily accomodate invariance principles. Inevitably then, it must also 
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fail as an arbiter of material transfer classifications, thereby ultimatel 
causing collapse of the discourse's conceptual structure. y 
It was consequently the interaction of the two discourses that under-
~ed . the ~emp~rary r~lative integrity ~f economic anthropology, 
pOlsorungl dissemmatmg Its concept of the gIft, and eroding its transient 
identity as a discourse distinct from market economy discourse. But how 
on this view of relatively distinct discourses in competition does 
Mirowski understand neoclassical economic theory? 
Following Alvin Gouldner, he argues that a system of pure value 
equivalence, with pervasive balance in exchange, zero arbitrage, and 'no 
trade' theorems everywhere, is an unstable conceptual system because it 
provides no reason for trade - its own paradox of intentionality. The 'no 
free lunch' crowd accordingly cannot resist the concept of the gift 
without return, because it is precisely the concept of gain from trade 
needed in but absent from the bloodless conceptual apparatus of 
exchange of equivalent for equivalent. We might, then, imagine that 
contact with anthropological discourse has contaminated neoclassical 
discourse in a manner not dissimilar to the manner in which neoclassi-
cism has corrupted economic anthropology. 
But this does not seem to be Mirowski's argument. Rather his 
Goedelian argument, in two steps, is that (a) any formally definite 
system must contain results stateable but not provable within the system, 
and (b) post hoc, sleight-of-hand inclusions of undecidable statements 
into formal systems is a mug's game, an irreducibly arbitrary procedure 
that creates a false sense of comprehenSive explanation. Thus it is neo-
classicism 's conceptual pretension to structural completeness, an internal 
incoherence, that ultimately betrays it, not the vitality of an alternative 
discourse. Indeed, neoclassicism's appropriation of anthropology'S gift 
concept of unrequited gain is opportunistic and gratuitous, since the 
discourse's structural strategy of closure by addition of undecidable 
statement creates an open field of concepts from which to select, a point 
made especially evident by the jack-of-all trades development of game 
theory. 
Pol. [Behind] What, hoI help, help, help! 
Ham. [Drawing] How now! a rat? Dead, for a ducat, dead! 
[Makes a pass through the arras.] 
Pol. [Behind] 0, I am slain! 
[Falls and dies.] 
Modernism rests securely upon a paradox. (1) It (modernism) begins 
by supposing that reality anchors language, and gives language its intel-
ligibility. Truth is ordinarily and widely thought of as a correspondence 
between statements, propositions, or sentences and states of affairs in the 
world. Individual terms and expressions are typically thought to acquire 
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their meanings according to what they stand for, refer to, or pick out from 
the world. Thus reality both lies behind language and regulates language. 
(2) Yet because reality can only be described in language, we are never able 
to consult reality apart from language to determine whether language does 
indeed describe reality. We attempt to tum from language to the real, but 
only discover language once again. Thus it seems that language cannot be 
about reality. (3) But what is language about if it is not about reality? To say 
language is about language seems to say little, if anything at all. (4) [Return 
to (1)]. 
Gudeman sees economic anthropologists and neoclassical economists as 
both offering essentialist and modernist approaches to understanding gifts 
and reciprocity, the former basing their analysis on altruism, and the latter 
basing theirs on sell-interest. The generation of anthropologists since 
Marcel Mauss has regarded reciprocity as a pillar of social life, because they 
believe reciprocity accurately reflects the character of dyadic relationships 
between individuals that anthropologists believe to be.at the core of society. 
Neoclassical economists also regard reciprocity as a pillar of social life, but 
alternatively believe reciprocity reflects the play of individual motivation in 
dyadic relationships that neoclassical economists regard as being at the core 
of society. Both then, believe their respective discourses rest on real 
economic and social foundations. These foundations regulate what they 
may each say about reciprocity, exchange, and gifts by determining the 
truth of the statements they make and the meanings of their individual 
terms and expressions. These real world foundations also validate their 
respective characterizations of reciprocity, exchange, and gifts, since each 
view is judged, preferred to the other in virtue of its more accurately 
capturing underlying real world foundations. Of course it makes little sense 
to suppose that two discourses that contradict one another are both correct 
and accurate reflections of one and the same real world. Yet neither anthro-
pologists nor economists can consult the world apart from the discourse in 
which they operate to compare language and reality, and then demonstrate 
their view to be correct and their opponent's mistaken. Both of course claim 
to get at the essentials of reciprocity, but neither is acquainted with 
anything more than a concept of the essential. 
Indeed since every attempt to acquire access to the real world must 
produce but another concept of the real world, for essentialists the real 
must always appear in endless retreat from possible capture in language. 
But let us bring this tedious story to a close. Since any attempt to penetrate 
the veil of language and grasp the real world must destroy the object 
sought, we should abandon the notion that discourses rest on real world 
foundations, and ask how else we might understand gifts and reciprocity. 
Gudeman's view is that economic processes may be seen to be organized 
in two distinct ways that appear separately, in shifting combinations, and in 
tension with one another. There are production and distribution processes 
478 
GIFTS AND TRADE 
that economists study as the market economy, but these processes are 
also socially mediated through families, household groups, villages, 
nations, etc. that anthropologists study as the community form of the 
economy. Reciprocity consequently needs to be understood differently 
according to the operant perspective. But it is a mistake to think that this 
means reciprocity simply corresponds to different things for economists 
and anthropologists. 
For Gudeman reciprocity does not correspond to any set of institu-
tions or processes in the community form of the economy, but is rather a 
way of making community. First, the gift extends the commons to 
someone outside a community. The gift transforms social relationships. 
Second, if the gift is reciprocated, the return both accepts commensality, 
yet also signals difference and independence. The reciprocal exchange of 
gifts consequently creates a larger, encompassing community in which 
there always remains a fragile balance between distance and closeness, 
detachment and warmth. Thus, if the gift in anthropological discourse is 
'about' anything, it is about the uncertainty of community. But then we 
should not attempt to understand the language of gifts and reciprocity as 
a reflection of something behind discourse. Reciprocity is not at the core 
of society. Reciprocity is an expression of social economic processes - a 
secondary phenomenon, a badge worn, if briefly, upon the giving of the 
gift. 
Link to Local Home Page 
This goes on every page. Given the nature of the Web, you 
can't assume that everyone is beginning at the same starting 
point and following the links down. The user could be bailing in 
from some other link to somewhere deep in the dusty comers of 
the sprawl. The user may be completely lost, or may assume that 
your page is part of the company he or she just branched from. 
This can also happen with users using bookmarks to specific 
pages. Always show them a way home. 
(Cearley, 1998: 187) 
Modernist metanarratives require centers of gravitation. They anchor 
a conceptual apparatus by identifying points of entry that channel 
passage to other conceptual sites. Those latter sites thus come with 
genealogies. A concept-site first gains meaning in terms of its association 
with the concept-sites previously visited; it gains additional meaning in 
terms of associations with concepts-sites subsequently visited. The entire 
narrative is understood in terms of its point of entry. At" the same time, 
concepts-sites that cannot be accessed from a network of conceptual sites 
are impaired in their meaning from the perspective of the network. They 
either fall entirely outside the network, or should they be accessible, they 
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inherit the genealogy of the network with its original center of gravita-
tion. That is ... unless the network's travellers pass far enough out upon 
the network's periphery that the gravitational pull of its center ceases to 
operate. Then one might even pass to another network whose links are 
designed to direct the traveler to this new network's center of gravity. 
Preventing escape from a conceptual network, casual or intentional, thus 
requires that it be centripetally constructed. 'Always show them a way 
home.' 
William Milberg knows the way home in 'neoclassical international 
economics' . At the top of the neoclassical home page it reads, 'the 
economy as market'. From there one goes to 'competition' where one 
learns about 'equilibrium'. Having visited these sites one is then suffi-
ciently prepared to click on 'general equilibrium competitive analysis', 
from which one can finally access 'the theory of international trade', 
including such otherwise accessible sites as 'Heckscher-Ohlin', 'Stolper-
Samuelson', and 'Rybczinski' (all accompanied b.¥ easy links to the 
necessary bio sites). A convenient feature of the network as a whole is 
that it is designed to return the visitor from any particular concept-site to 
other concept-sites of importance. Or, one always has the option of 
simply returning to 'home', and then passing down through any of the 
pathways in the network one chooses. An egalitarian feature of the 
network is that accidental visitors to any of the network's concept-sites 
are treated no differently than regular visitors. The highly developed 
character of the network is reflected in the fact that these accidental visi- . 
tors are encouraged at every possible point to go to 'home' so as to be 
able to learn the network from its point of entry. 
Of course discourses are always under (re)construction. Their producers 
are ever in search of ways to better organize their concept-sites, and this 
process continually reveals new implications and connections not previ-
ously imagined that then require integration into the overall network. 
However there are risks involved. Because reconstruction is initially 
focused on a particular concept-site in the network, the consequences of its 
reconstruction are often not immediately apparent. 
Milberg asks us to consider the case of site foreman, Paul Krugman, 
founder of the 'new international economics'. For a long time the 'theory 
of international trade' site was closely connected to the 'competition' site. 
Krugman wondered whether it might not be possible to link the former 
site to an infrequently visited one, 'imperfect competition'. From there he 
imagined further connections to 'game-playing man' (replacing visits to 
'rational economic man') and 'trade-oriented industrial/commercial 
policies' (replacing visits to 'laissez jaire/ free trade'). Krugman's argu-
ment for re-connecting the 'theory of international trade' in these ways 
was based on the importance of intra-industry trade and the apparent 
success of trade-orientated policies in Japan and South Korea. 
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Yet as Milberg explains, Krugman soon found that these strategies for 
developing the 'neoclassical international economics' site met with 
considerable disfavor from others involved in the maintenance and 
reconstruction of both this site and the 'economy as market' site in which 
it is embedded. The issue was later cast as a technical problem involved 
in re-building the 'theory of international trade' site: 'the models were 
too sensitive to particular assumptions, and they encouraged unrealistic 
attempts to fine tune the activities of the state'. But Milberg identifies a 
more serious problem with Krugman's strategies. His proposed connec-
tions seemed to involve stronger links to other home pages than to the 
'economy as market' home page. Indeed, upon arriving at the 'imperfect 
competition' site one does find connections to 'transnational corpora-
tions' and 'the state', which in turn have close links to the 'political 
economy' home page. 
Krugman, it seems, originally failed to appreciate how far out on the 
periphery of the 'economy as market' network the 'transnational corpo-
rations' and 'the state' sites lay. But to his credit he soon recognized that 
visiting those sites was incompatible with the centripetal nature of the 
'economy as market' network. At least in the short run, then, until a 
fuller structure of links through the 'optimization' site could be created 
for 'transnational corporations' and 'the state', he agreed that work 
would have to be discontinued in this area. 
But lest the implications of all this be misunderstood, note that 
Milberg does not recommend a politics of constructing a rival 'political 
economy' home page with peripheral links designed to invade the 
'economy as market' home page and lure its visitors away. In fact, he 
tells us that a postrnodern theory of international trade must lack a 
central metaphor and cannot be rendered into a single metanarrative. 
There seems to be both positive and normative reasons for thinking 
this. From a positive point of view, it is naive to suppose that the center 
can hold in any discourse for any extended period of time. Discourse is 
always decentering itself, because the opportunity to explore in ways 
that may take one outwards from any given site will always constitute an 
attraction. From a normative point of view, on the other hand, it seems 
we ought also resist the modernist impulse to compel conceptual traffic 
to follow rigidly predetermined pathways. Indeed, we ought to 
encourage travellers to visit the 'free trade in ideas' site (one, it turns out, 
without links to the neoclassical 'economy as market' site) . They should 
travel prepared, however. The 'free trade in ideas' site is always under 
construction. 
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